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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
for the loan that the property was owned by plaintiff and Elder in fee and
that the loan was carried in the name of plaintiff and Elder. Judgment
below was for defendant on the ground that no resulting trust existed
between plaintiff and Elder in the latter's lifetime in respect of the prop-
erty, and no trust relation has since existed between plaintiff and defend-
ant. Held: Judgment affirmed. Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 13447, pro-
vides: "When a conveyance for a valuable consideration is made to one
person and the consideration therefor is paid by another, no trust shall
result in favor of the latter, but title shall vest in the former subject to
the provisions of the next sections." And Sec. 13449 provides: "The
provisions of 13447 shall not extend to cases where it appears, by agree-
ment, and without fraudulent intent, the party to whom the conveyance
was made or in whom the title shall vest, was to hold the land in trust
for the party paying the purchase price." There was not sufficient evi-
dence, under the statute, to show that Elder agreed to hold the land in
trust for plaintiff. Kemp v. Elder, Appellate Court of Indiana, February
21, 1930, 170 N. E. 90.
A resulting trust must arise at or before the time of the conveyance.
Westerfield v. Kimmer, 82 Ind. 365; Toney v. Wend lind, 138 Ind. 228;
Hughes v. White, 117 Ind. 470.
In order to create a resulting trust under these sections of the statutes,
the purchase money must be paid at the time of or before the conveyance
is made. A resulting trust can not be created by funds subsequently
furnished. Toney v. Wendlind, supra; People's Bank and Trust Co. v.
Mills, 193 Ind. 131; Rickes v. Rickes, 81 Ind. App. 533.
In the principal case there was no evidence that plaintiff furnished any
of the purchase money at or before the purchase of the land by Elder.
Nor was there any evidence of what portion, if any, of the purchase price
was paid by plaintiff. Elder's will and the probate thereof is a disavowal
of any trust in respect of the land.
Where part payment of the purchase money is claimed the exact por-
tion should be clearly shown. Hulton v. Cunningham, 28 Ind. App. 295;
Irwin v. Ivers, 7 Ind. 308.
In view of the evidence, the case is clearly correct under the statutes.
R. C. H.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER CONTRACTS--CONDITIONS-In 1916 H. McCool,
in writing, agreed to convey to the defendants certain real estate. The
agreement provided that the conveyance should be made when the defend-
ants had paid the full purchase price and interest, payments to be made as
follows: $14 at the signing of the agreement and $14 in advance each
month until the full purchase price, with interest at 6% was paid. Time
of payment was made of the essence of the contract, and, on failure of the
defendants to promptly make the payments or to perform any of their cove-
nants, the contract, at the option of the vendors, was to be forfeited and
determined. In 1927 McCool transferred the property and sales agree-
ment to the plaintiff. At this time the defendants were in default in their
payments. Payments had been made irregularly and in irregular amounts
long after they were due. Ten days before the commencement of this
suit, the plaintiff called at the home of the defendants and demanded pos-
RECENT CASE NOTES
session under the contract. Plaintiff brings this action in ejectment. Held:
Judgment for defendants. Baker et ux. v. Eades, Appellate Court of
Indiana, January 29, 1930, 169 N. E. 686.
The court said that the plaintiff waived the condition requiring pay-
ments to be made in advance each month, and waived the condition making
time of the essence of the contract. The provision of payment each and
every month constituted an express promissory condition precedent. That
is, it was a condition expressed in the contract, containing a promise of
the defendant to perform the condition, and it was precedent to perform-
ance by the plaintiff. Since it was a promissory condition, it gave a right
to the plaintiff-a right to compel the defendant to pay according to his
promise. A right cannot be waived. 35 Yale Law Journal, 970; Ewart,
Waiver Distributed. Therefore the plaintiff did not waive this condition.
The plaintiff, by accepting payments irregularly, represented to the de-
fendant that he would not demand strict performance of the promissory
condition to pay. Inferring that the defendant relied upon this representa-
tion, we have a case of estoppel. One can be estopped from asserting a
right, although he cannot waive it. Ewart, Waiver Distributed. There-
fore, should not the court have said that the plaintiff is estopped from
setting up the breach of the condition, rather than that he waived it? The
provision as to time being of the essence of the contract is an express con-
dition precedent. Whether it is promissory or casual is difficult to deter-
mine. It would seem to be promissory, and if it is, then the above reason-
ing will apply and estoppel instead of waiver would be found in the same
way. However, if it is a casual condition-that is, it does not include a
promise and the defendant would not be liable in damages for its breach-
it will not be necessary to go so far. A casual condition would give only
a privilege to the plaintiff. A privilege can be waived. A common example
of this where A makes an offer to B. B has the privilege of accepting,
and if he rejects the offer he waives his privilege of acceptance. There.
fore a casual condition precedent may be waived. Now that the conditions
of payments every month and of time being of the essence of the contract
are rendered nugatory in effect by estoppel, we really have a new contract
to sell between the parties in which the defendant has a reasonable time
to pay. Since the plaintiff did not give the defendant a reasonable time
to perform, and since the law looks with disfavor on forfeiture, the result
of the case is clearly right. J. A. B.
WAREHOUSEMEN-DuTY To USE ORDINARY CARE-RECOVERY FOR NEGLI-
GENE-The appellants, carriers and warehousemen, contracted with appel-
lee to store his household goods and later transport them to Chicago.
Goods were placed in appellants' Indianapolis warehouse where they were
destroyed by an accidental fire. The warehouse was a wooden structure,
and appellee's goods were piled at one end of the building, together with
other goods stored there, and were held in place by wooden supports. There
was no protection between the center of the building, where appellants kept
their trucks, and the household goods. After the fire an electric light drop
was found hanging close to the open gasoline tank of one of these trucks.
Appellee alleged that appellant was negligent in placing the goods in such
a highly inflammable structure which they should have known was not
